De Facto Times

“Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22:21).

Discourse is often polluted with neglectful misunderstandings, some of which are too foolish to ignore. It is best to be merciful with those who misunderstand but nonetheless authoritative on their missteps so as to prevent them from occurring in the future. Of the many missteps that go uncriticized, the discourse on the relationship between religion and state is a prime example. It’s not that I find the common conclusion on the matter disagreeable—I agree with keeping religion and state separate. No, the misstep that bothers me is not the conclusion, but rather, the hazy categorization of what church and state actually means. I suspect such hazy categorizations have arisen due to the motive by which people ascribe the term being impure; that is, the term is not used for any definitive ascriptions, and instead as a political rallying cry meant to muddy the reputation of political figures while adding to the incompetent laundry list of their wrongs. Not only has the categorization of church and state been weak, but those who evoke it seem not to understand why it’s wrong.

Recently, Vox’s Ian Millhiser wrote an article titled, “America’s (lack of) separation between church and state, explained,” wherein he asserts that this separation is weaker than we perceive in the United States due to the presence of a conservative Supreme Court and the permission of student vouchers to fund religious schools, Trump centering his campaign around religion and selling Bibles, the tax-exempt status of churches, and pervasive religious nods and symbolism in government matters. Although some of these factors are not direct causes of America’s supposed “lack of separation between church and state,” Millhiser explains that “law is ultimately subordinate to politics, and those politics favor religion—especially Christianity.” Although Millhiser is correct in his assessment that law follows politics and politics favors religion, this is nonetheless a poor justification for saying that there is a lack of separation between church and state and demonstrates an incomplete understanding of what such a separation is.

Before addressing Millhiser’s points, I believe it is foremost important to define the problem with a lack of separation between church and state. And, going forward, due to the drawn-out nature of the phrase “lack of separation of church and state,” I will group the words up together into churchenstate for the sake of simplicity. Churchenstate is not a problem because it violates religious freedom. Religious freedom is a means, not an end; it serves security. Rather, churchenstate is a conflict of interest. True churchenstate is theocratic or caesaropapist; it’s either clergy in positions of government power while endorsing their religious role through the state, or a lay state actor having an authority role in religion. This conflict of interest negatively impacts both politics and religion, as it introduces a higher power incentive to religion and a supernatural control for lay state actors. These incentives may lead to disingenuous actors pursuing their own selfish interests at the expense of the people’s.

Additionally, it is worth covering what isn’t churchenstate. You could have a politician who happens to be a priest, so long as the laws and constitution do not make government roles exclusively clerical. Politicians campaigning or religion and religious people being elected is not churchenstate. We cannot expect every person in government to be completely secular or for the voters to be secular. Similarly, political parties based on religion are not churchenstate, even if they achieve high membership in government. If one believes in a religion and has its values, what point is there in removing the label of the religion? At that point, that’s just dishonesty. It’s okay to run on religion because religion carries with it philosophy and values that are meaningful to political change. Laws based on reason achieved through religion are not churchenstate, otherwise, that would encompass an incredibly large percentage of laws in the world. And of course, mere references a government makes to religion in any capacity without binding legality cannot constitute churchenstate. Theocracies cannot only be composed of religious references.

Millhiser, when talking about the Supreme Court, begins with the bold assertion that “…the Court is now actively tearing down whatever barrier used to exist between church and state.” The case he provides as an example is Carson v. Makin (2022), a case that requires states to fund religious charter schools with the taxes of citizens. However, this framing is intentionally neglectful in its focus; Maine helps finance the tuition of students who live in school districts without a secondary school or that don’t contract a school from another town. This allows parents to choose where to send their children with the state’s sponsorship. “Nonsectarian” schools were disallowed until Carson v. Makin’s ruling. Sure—it’s true to say that tax dollars are funding a religious school—but it’s vital not to dispense with the fact that this is primarily about ensuring access to education. Religious institutions are not being forced upon those choosing the schools; it is the choice of the parents. And what difference does it make?

It’s true that Donald Trump sold Bibles and made numerous religious allusions during his 2024 presidential campaign. Regardless of whether such rhetoric is genuine or tasteful, is this an example of churchenstate? Clearly not—there is no hint here of Trump supporting laws with religious ends or attempting to use his position of power to manipulate religion.

So, should religious institutions be tax-exempt? Tax exemption creates an incentive for institutions to be recognized as religious, however, it does not necessarily incentivize malpractice among the established religious institutions that are not “for-profit” in any traditional sense. Therefore, the root of the problem with tax exemption is not necessarily the tax exemption itself but moreso the criteria for legitimization on which religions qualify and whether or not they are verifiably non-profit in a traditional sense (excluding donation and the like). Tax exemption certainly serves to differentiate religious institutions from other institutions, but there are no grounds to demonstrate a lack of separation.

Religious nods and symbolism in the United States are notable for their distinction from the secular nature of the American government and its philosophy. The most frequently cited examples are the slogan “In God we Trust” present on American coins, the line “One nation under God” in the national anthem, and the employment of a Senate Chaplain who opens sessions with prayer. It is worth noting that none of these denote a specific religion outside of a vague theism. Senate Chaplains, although they have historically been Christian, are not required to be. These references are so unspecific that they fail to lend power to any real religious institution. The most one could claim is that they lend sociocultural credibility to theism, for whatever marginal amount that might be worth.

Next time you see someone claim a lack of separation between church and state, look upon such claims with a careful eye. It is seldom the case that such cries portray reality, and even less so understanding. Alas, we should strive to keep church and state in separate realms, unbothered by false alarms.

As an afternote, I feel that it is important to defend the common interpretation of the famed “Render unto Caesar” quote.

The line I’ve started this article with could be interpreted in a variety of ways and has not always been understood as a separation of church and state. The context in which this famous line is espoused is as follows: Questioners approach Jesus and ask whether or not they should pay taxes. Jesus believes this to be a trap set for His arrest, with the questioners expecting that He will instruct them not to pay taxes. Instead, Jesus defends paying taxes. Four primary interpretations may be derived from this passage. Either Jesus is explaining rightful property to His students, He is drawing a division of independence between state and religious operations, He is attempting to evade the questioners through dishonesty, or He is justifying divine right. Given Jesus’s emphasis on honesty, the third option is unlikely. The fourth option, that of divine right, assumes that the clause of rending unto God what is God’s intends to hierarchically further the first clause rather than differentiate the two. Given the full context of Christ’s crucifixion at the hands of Rome and the indication of Roman injustice, it is unlikely that the intention of this line is to provide Caesar with divine right. The first and second interpretations seem to falter on certain grounds, primarily being that no realm could possibly be outside of the realm of God, so Caesar must be the property of God, and hence, the two cannot be differentiated as such. However, such a thought ignores the fact that if God’s property overwhelmingly encapsulates all other properties, giving unto the subproperties (i.e., that of Caesar) is not at all precluded. So, if the statement is placing two properties in distinction with one another, it must be more specific than the “property of God.” This line of reasoning makes more sense, as how does one give unto God what is God’s? Sure, there’s prayer, but more broadly, there are places of worship and religious institutions built around those places of worship. Therefore, it is likely that both the first and the second interpretations are the most valid.