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Why is reason important? Reason, as the Enlightenment and contractualist philosophers often saw it, was the device that brought man to civilization. Without reason, man would have been unequipped to progress beyond his most rudimentary form, with such a form varying from philosopher to philosopher. Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Locke were all primarily concerned with the formation of the state in their most prized works. Such sentiments would prove influential on philosophers such as Voltaire and James Madison. Thus, with reason playing the role of ushering in this state, it is not only an important variable, but one integral to fully comprehending the contractualist position. The contractualists tend not to disagree on the role of reason as it pertains to the state. Instead, they differ in their prescriptive claims towards reason and its ancillary consequences.

Defining Reason

Before weighing the various perspectives on reason, it is crucial to understand what is meant by reason. Because the word itself is rather vague, it is important to specify what the philosophers are referring to in more detail, not only as it pertains to the role of reason, but moreover, its chief faculty. Both Hobbes and Locke take a more genealogical approach to the terminological variables they yield, delving into heavy detail on each step of their explanation to slowly build up their arguments (particularly in Leviathan and An Essay Concerning Human Understanding). Thus, their definitions of reason are robust and worth putting forth. This is even truer for Hobbes due to his influence on all the future contractualists in his reasoning, meaning that their usage of reason likely bears similarity to his own.

Thomas Hobbes defined reason as “nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and subtracting) of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our thoughts” (Hobbes 35). Hobbes believed that reason was not a sense, nor was it attained by experience. Instead, he claimed it was “attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call Science” (Hobbes 39). In less antiquated syntax, Hobbes defines reason as the addition and subtraction of concepts. Deducing a binary response in a syllogism is an example of such a definition of reason. A network of reasoning, Hobbes asserts, is science.

John Locke specifies that the definition of reason he is interested in exploring “stands for faculty in man, that faculty, whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident that he much surpasses them” (Locke 590). Reason is, therefore, the human ability that distinguishes man from beast and asserts his superiority. Locke explains that reason serves “the enlargement of our knowledge, and the regulating our assent: for it hath to do, both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary, and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz. sagacity and illation. By one, it finds out, and by the other, it so orders the intermediate ideas, as to discover what connexion there is…” (Locke 590). Locke is contending that reason consists of two faculties: sagacity and illation. Illation is drawing perceived connections between ideas, i.e., inference, whereas sagacity is one’s ability to do so, i.e., their wisdom. Therefore, Locke defines reason as the faculties of inference and the ability to attain wisdom, with a strong emphasis on the ability of deductive syllogisms.

Although differing in their minutiae and presentation, Hobbes and Locke’s definitions of reason still bear striking similarities. Both deny that reason is a sense and assert that syllogisms are important facets of reason. Hobbes focuses more on names, or concepts, and their place as mathematical variables, whereas Locke describes the connection of ideas in more detail. At their core, however, both Hobbes and Locke would agree that reason is a conditional mechanism by which new information is imbibed into knowledge by identifying the new information’s alignment with the knowledge. This clear common ground, then, may be inferred as the version of reason that is being referred to when discussed by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire, and Madison.

Conflicting Philosophies of Reason

It is worth dividing the reason theorists into two categories, not because there are only two variants of thought on the matter, but because these categories succinctly capture a line of ideological disagreement between the thinkers. On one end, there are the critics of reason who view it as an overall negative force; on the other end, there are the proponents of reason who view it as an overall positive force. Such a divide is best demonstrated with the quarrel between Rousseau and Voltaire, with Rousseau being the most notable critic of reason and Voltaire expressing advocacy for the empiricist, Lockean view of reason while lending scathing critiques to Rousseau. In this analysis, Rousseau’s critique of reason is supplemented by Madison, whereas Voltaire’s is largely left to his contractualist influences in Hobbes and Locke.

Rousseau’s famous indictment of reason arrives in his treatise, A Discourse on Inequality, a work that explores many of the elements toyed with by the contractualists in a new manner, particularly the state of nature. He portrays the state of nature as ideal in a way that modern scholars might label ‘utopian.’ In this view, man was once one with nature and “dispersed among the bests” (Rousseau 81), therefore being forced to “develop a robust and almost immutable constitution” (Rousseau 82). He is strong, fast, and fearless—able to fend off predators out of necessity, but nonetheless unsocial. Rousseau intermittently takes the time to emphasize how such a state is free from the ever-changing nature of the world caused by man’s passions and caprices. He is without the indolence of luxury, imbued with harmful intent toward his fellow man, and is morally and politically equal with his seldom-seen peers (Rousseau 83). Such a lifestyle is upheld by the principles that Rousseau outlines as being antecedent to reason: “the first gives us an ardent interest in our own wellbeing and our own preservation; the second inspires in us a natural aversion to seeing any other sentient being perish or suffer, especially if it is one of our kind” (Rousseau 70). Before reason took charge, “self preservation [was] the savage’s only concern” (Rousseau 86) and thus he had no reason to wish or inflict ill upon others. Due to his limited reason, the only good the natural man knew was limited to his physical needs, with the only good things being “food, a female and repose, and the only evils he fears are pain and hunger” (Rousseau 89). Rousseau follows his principles that are antecedent to reason with one of his boldest assertions, proclaiming that “reason has succeeded in suffocating nature” (Rousseau 70). Reason has led us out of the state of nature and thus is responsible for our self-domestication. Just as the domestic animal degenerates unrecognizably beyond the wild one, the strong and equal man of the state of nature, who, “in becoming sociable and a slave, [grew] feeble, timid, servile; and his soft and effeminate way of life [completed] the enervation both of his strength and courage” (Rousseau 86). The bemoaning of the consequences of reason continues, “How many crimes, wars, murders; how much misery and horror the human race would have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: ‘Beware of listening to this imposter. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone and that the earth itself belongs to no one!’” (Rousseau 109).

Rousseau is able to pinpoint a moment at which reason, as traditionally understood through the Hobbesian and Lockean definitions, is supposedly proven to be the catalyst for leaving the state of nature and engendering human decline. “This repeated employment of entities distinct from himself and distinct from each other must naturally have engendered in men’s minds the perception of certain relationships. Those relationships which we express by the words ‘large’, ‘small’, ‘strong’, ‘weak’, ‘fast’, ‘slow’, ‘fearful’, ‘bold’, and other similar ideas, compared when necessary and almost unthinkingly, finally produced in him some kind of reflection” (Rousseau 110). These relationships directly evoke the ‘connections’ emphasized by John Locke. The entities distinct from man being discussed are mentioned in the previous paragraph to be environmental adaptations resulting from the spread of man, such as fishing, bow hunting, wearing clothes, and replicating fire. The novelty of such resources granted man the opportunity of comparison, and thus, the illatory faculty of reason was born. And with it, man began to apply this illatory faculty not only to tools, but to traits in other humans. So, with the highest pride from a favorable comparison, there must also be the highest jealousy from an unfavorable one. Such sentiments lead to expectations, misery, and conflict. In this imbalance of expectation, property is claimed and fought for, and inequality thrives. Thus, reason is not only a problem for its enfeeblement of man, but also its immiseration of man.

James Madison’s Federalist No. 10 expressed a somewhat critical view of reason, demonstrating that reason is the source of factions among men and therefore an obstacle to peace, which necessitates a balanced government. Madison emphasized the reciprocal relationship between reason, self-love, and passion, ultimately determining that reason had “divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them more likely to oppress each other than to cooperate for their common good” (Madison et al. 124). Such an assertion of reason leading to factionalism is reminiscent of Rousseau’s explanation of the rise of jealousy, wherein reason leads people to compare themselves to others rather than being content with their state. Similarly, in Federalist No. 51, Madison argues that the importance of a republic is “not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part” (Madison et al. 321). Such injustice is congruent with the inequality brought about by reason, as argued by Rousseau.

Voltaire criticized Rousseau’s view of reason. Instead of viewing reason as a force that inhibits the liberty of the state of nature, Voltaire thought that reason was a weapon of liberty and progress. In Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary, he implies that reason is some type of deduction through a dialogue between two characters on religion (Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 257–258). Voltaire, an atheist, placed a heavy emphasis on religious freedom and tended to be skeptical of claims of old. Having experienced exile for his beliefs, freedom to reason and reasoning to be free were rather important to him. Tolerance, justice, and science were the results of reason. Voltaire addressed a letter to Rousseau, sarcastically remarking to him, “no one has ever been so witty as you are in trying to turn us into brutes: to read your book makes one long to go about all fours. Since, however, it is now some sixty years since I gave up the practice, I feel that it is unfortunately impossible for me to resume it: I leave this natural habit to those more fit for it than are you and I” (Voltaire, Letter to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1775). Voltaire agrees that “science and literature have sometimes done a great deal of harm” (Voltaire, Letter to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1775), but only insofar as other scientists rooted in tradition have established barriers for those attempting progress. That is to say, those who are unreasonable and working under the guise of reason actually work to suppress it. Voltaire, although disagreeing with the religious arguments made by Locke and Hobbes, sides with the proponents of reason in part for his own very personal matters.

On the other hand, Hobbes was favorable towards reason as a means of exiting the state of nature because he supposed that the disposition of humans was towards war, having written, “So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary” (Hobbes 102–103). He continues by describing the state of war, “In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 103). Hobbes does not believe that right and wrong, just and unjust, are properly defined during times of war (Hobbes 104). Given the long list of negative attributes and prohibitions during the state of war, Hobbes concluded that it was necessary to suppress the human disposition for war to ensure times of peace. Hobbes was far more concerned with order than freedom and equality, viewing the state of nature as a constant onslaught of violent war that needed to be stopped at all costs. Thus, he puts forth that the possible means of escaping the natural state of war is through reason (Hobbes 105).

Despite some agreements, Rousseau was in the minority for his critical view of reason. Though it is worth noting that Rousseau himself understood his position to be the unpopular one, explicitly refuting the philosophers that had come before him. He intended to directly refute the Hobbesian state of nature, i.e., the vehicle from which reason is born and catapults out of, having written, “let us not conclude with Hobbes that man is naturally evil just because he has no idea of goodness” (Rousseau 98). Rousseau even quotes Locke, whose philosophy on reason is largely incongruent with his own, to support his points, having written, “for according to the wise Locke: ‘Where there is no property, there is no injury,’” (Rousseau 115). Rousseau, Locke, and Hobbes agree that reason is the vehicle that delivers man from the state of nature, as well as sharing similar ideas on the properties and functions of reason as demonstrated through Hobbes’ and Locke’s similar definitions and Rousseau’s aligned usage of the word. All of these philosophers describe various interpretations of the state of nature, often determining the trajectory of their views on whether reason is a tool to be critical of or not. Locke and Hobbes view the territory beyond the state of nature as preferable to it, and therefore, view reason as an ultimately good mechanism. And, although the two advocate for reason, they do not believe reason to be common, raising questions in regards to the difficulty of leaving the state of nature. Hobbes claims reason for men serves “little use in common life” (Hobbes 39), with Locke similarly stating, “He that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find men reason there, perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism, nor can reduce any one argument to those forms: and I do believe scarce anyone ever makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself” (Locke 592). Rousseau, on the other hand, romanticizes the state of nature and is therefore critical of the results of reason. Nonetheless, he views the development of reason and its consequences as inevitable.